Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 28

Issue

Article 9

January 2002

On a Collision Course--Two Potential Environmental Conflicts
between the U.S. and Canada
Frank E. Loy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frank E. Loy, On a Collision Course--Two Potential Environmental Conflicts between the U.S. and Canada,
28 Can.-U.S. L.J. 11 (2002)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol28/iss/9

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

ON A COLLISION COURSE?
TWO POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND CANADA
Frank E. Loy'
Let me start by expressing the profound regret of all Americans for the
disaster that occurred in Afghanistan yesterday, which took the lives of four
brave, young Canadians and seriously injured six others.' Friendly fire is a
cost of war, but what happened is unbelievably regrettable, and I am just as
sorry as I can be that it happened. I know all my American colleagues share
in that sentiment.
Let me also say, as an introduction, that it is an enormous pleasure to
share a platform here with Alan Nymark, the Deputy Minister of
Environment Canada. Alan and I knew each other, and worked with each
other, for a number of years. He is respected enormously by all Americans
and, in fact, by everyone on the international scene that has dealt with him
(and that is a lot of people). Canada is lucky to have him in his position. I
am glad to share a moment with him.
In view of Henry's imposed time limitations, I am going to stick largely
to some policy issues on two questions that are going to be discussed in
greater detail in the coming days. First, what are the possible implications
and consequences of Canada being a party to Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change 2 the United States not being a party? And, second, I want to say a
couple words about the large number of cases that have arisen under Chapter
11, the investment chapter of NAFTA,3 and what they mean for public policy
in the area of police powers, health and environment.

Former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs (1998-2001). B.A., University
of California, Los Angeles; LL.B., Harvard University. Additional biographical information
available at page xiv.
1 See, e.g., Mark Turner & Ken Warn, Probe Planned After U.S. Kills Canadians in
Afghanistan, FIN. TIMES, April 19, 2002, at P11.
2 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/199717IAdd.2,37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, Ch. 11, 32
I.L.M. 605, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA Chapter 11].
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THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
Kyoto is an innovative and meaningful response to what I believe (and
what I think Canada also believes) is today's most significant threat to our
environment. Canada and the United States collaborated exceptionally well
in shaping that agreement. They, together with Australia, Japan, and a
couple other countries, operating under a name of the "Umbrella Group,"
sought to bring forward an agreement with two fundamental qualities: (1) an
assurance that reductions in greenhouse gases really happened; and (2) an
assurance that those with obligations to make the reductions happen namely, corporations and governments, but principally the corporations would be
permitted to limit their emissions in the most cost-effective
4
manner.
This would require a degree of built-in flexibility that has not been
present in all that many international agreements, and the provisions that
produced this flexibility were counterintuitive to many Europeans,
particularly to those who were more inclined to mandate specific "how-to"
provisions.5 In Kyoto, this flexibility is achieved by the inclusion of all
greenhouse gases, not just CO 2;6 by permitting emitters to achieve their
reductions by investing in clean technology in developing countries; 7 and by
establishing an emissions trading mechanisms among various entities,
thereby permitting those that could reduce greenhouse gases more cheaply to
trade "credits" with those that could not. 8 Furthermore, we included in the
overall equation a credit system that would not only take into account actual
emission reductions, but would also include credits for carbon that is taken
out of the atmosphere - mostly by growing trees. 9 Were it not for the
insistence of the Umbrella Group, these provisions would not be in
agreement.
Now, of course, it is bittersweet that we find ourselves in the position that,
having achieved an agreement that I believe to be in many respects an
excellent one, the United States has decided it will not become a party to
Kyoto, at least not any time soon.
What are the potential Canadian-U.S. issues that may arise from the
decision by the U.S. not to become a party to the Protocol, while,
presumably, Canada will be a party?
4 See Fact Sheet on the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. View, at http://www.epa.
gov/globalwarming/publications/actions/cop5/kyoto_99.html (Oct. 1999).

5 See, e.g., Gordon Smith, We Must Act Now To Cool Carbon Fever, GLOBE & MAIL,

Nov. 30, 2000, at A17.

6 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Annex A.
7 See id., art. 12(3).
8 See id., art. 16bis.
9 These are what are commonly known as "sinks." See id., art 3(3).
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Canadian Policy and the Concerns of Industry
Some of your judgments may be different than mine, but I think that
Canada will ratify the agreement. I say that, although I am aware of the
opposition from western Canada,' 0 because of the careful and rather nuanced
support of the Protocol in Prime Minister Chrrtien's letter to the Canadian
Manufacturers and Exporters (CME) organization." Let me comment about
three points the Prime Minister raised, because Canada is an important leader
in this field, and it is important to know what its government is thinking.
First, he said that Canadians ought to understand how they are going to
meet their Kyoto target before deciding on ratification. 12 That seems like a
rather sensible requirement. I am quite sure when Minister David Anderson
and Alan Nymark come up with their implementation plan, that requirement
will be met. However, I suspect that whatever the government proposes will
be greeted by various groups ready to show that it will cause economic
disaster. CME has already published a document showing that Kyoto could
cost the manufacturing sector
as many as 450,000 jobs and up to $40 billion
3
dollars over eight years.'
Our experience in the U.S. has been that these predictions of disaster are
almost always wildly exaggerated. We had to deal with similar predictions
when we adopted the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (involving
sulfur dioxide emissions), when we were negotiating the Montreal Protocol
regarding ozone-depleting substances, and we heard them in connection with
the Kyoto negotiations. I would urge very careful scrutiny of the analyses
behind their predictions as well as some factoring in of the benefits to
Canada for becoming more energy-efficient.
Second, the Prime Minister mentioned the Protocol's positive impact in
stimulating innovation and environmental technologies. 14 He is absolutely
right. It cannot be anything but beneficial for Canadian industry and exports
to be more energy efficient, and to grow an entire industry devoted to energy
efficiency and environmentally beneficial products and processes. This
would be in star contrast with U.S. industries, which have very modest
10 See, e.g., Jill Mahoney, Anti-Kyoto Alternative Wins Airing, GLOBE & MAIL, Jun. 7,
2002, at A10.
"1 Letter from The Right Honourable Jean Chrdtien, Prime Minister of Canada, to the
Honourable Perrin Beatty, P.C., President & CEO of Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters
(March 26, 2002) (on file with CME and available online at http://www.the-alliance.org/
kyoto/documents/PM letter.pdf) [hereinafter Chrdtien Letter].
12 See id. at l.
13 See CANADIAN MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORTERS, PAIN WITHOUT GAIN: CANADA AND
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 9 (2002), available at http://www.the-alliance.org/kyoto/documents/
kyoto release.pdf.
14 See Chrdtien Letter, supra note 11, at 2.
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incentives to work towards energy efficiency, I would guess that Canada's
steps to meet its targets will represent a competitive plus for Canada.
Yesterday, Governor Engler of Michigan decided to devote 50 million
dollars to a program to try to help the automotive industry in Michigan
develop new technologies, particularly new engines. 15 Kyoto will provide
incentives to industries in Kyoto countries to do just that. Governor Engler's
proposal, as elementary and modest as it may sound, ought to be applauded.
The third point the Prime Minister made was that he recognized the
damage climate change can bring, and that mitigating the disruptive changes
in Canada's climate will bring major benefits, even if those benefits are hard
to measure.' 6 There was no disingenuousness in his letter, no "we do not
know enough about the possible harm to climate from human activities to
take meaningful action" rhetoric that we sometimes hear from the current
American administration. The Prime Minister should be complimented on
his forthrightness because, the fact is, the consequences of climate change are
going to be big. Sensible public policy needs to take into account the cost of
not acting. Science is rarely 100 percent certain. However, there was not a
single public policy issue that I faced during the years I was in government
where the science was as clear as it is in the case of global climate change.
The fact is that climate change will produce consequences, and they will be
severe.
Canadian industry has made two legitimate points that need to be taken
into account. First, there is the fear that, because the U.S. is not participating
in Kyoto, Canada will become uncompetitive. I tried to address that a
moment ago when I spoke about the long-term benefits of being energy
efficient. The second objection raised is that Canada's participation will not
be effective to halt climate change. After all, the reductions contemplated in
the first period of Kyoto, from 2008 to 2012, are not large enough.
Moreover, the U.S. and developing countries will not have binding emissions
targets.
Concerning the first point: it is absolutely true that the 2008 to 2012
reductions are not large enough. But the point of Kyoto is not primarily the
modest reductions that it will achieve in the first budget period, for they will
be especially modest in light of the United States' withdrawal. What Kyoto
does provide is an architecture for a long-term effort in an agreement that, as
the Prime Minister recognized, "represent[s] a very real first step towards the
kind of international cooperation that will be required to address the
problem."' 7
15 See, e.g., David Paulson & Rick Haglund, State Launches Center for New Power
Sources, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 18, 2002, at Al.
16 See Chrdtien Letter, supra note 11, at 2.
17 See id.
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It is right to point out that developing countries, which today account for
almost 50 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, must participate more
intensively in an international effort in the future. I believe they will. But it
is clear to me that they will not do so until they see that the developed
countries have taken serious steps to reduce their emissions. Kyoto
represents such a step. In fact, it is the agreement that the developing
countries have helped shape. There is no surer way to delay stronger efforts
by developing countries than to let Kyoto flounder. Once the developed
world takes significant action, by implementing the Protocol and by bringing
it into effect and by implementing domestic actions that reduce their own
emissions, then and only then will the developing countries come along in
some form of meaningful participation.
Current U.S. Policy - The Bush Plan
The other non-participant is the United States, the source of about a
quarter of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In the long run, no GHG
emission reduction scheme will work unless the United States takes a
meaningful role. I think one effective way to get the U.S. to participate in an
international regime will be to bring Kyoto into effect, to demonstrate that it
is an effective instrument, and to demonstrate the true costs of reducing
carbon emissions.
I do not think the present U.S. administration will soon change its mind
about Kyoto - maybe it never will. However, no administration lasts forever.
I think that, faced with a near-universal Kyoto Protocol that is proven to be
effective working instrument, the chances that the U.S. will participate in
some form of an international regime are not at all bad.
As Canada contemplates domestic measures that it needs to take to reduce
emissions, it ought not to be seduced in any way by the "alternate approach"
unveiled by President Bush in February.1 8 His domestic U.S. program will
work to reduce American "greenhouse gas intensity" by 18 percent over the
next ten years (greenhouse gas intensity being the ratio of greenhouse gas
emissions to economic output measured by GDP or some other index). 19 We
need to be candid and recognize that this program is a plan to do essentially
nothing for at least ten years.
The program has three major flaws. The first is that the proposed
reduction in greenhouse gas intensity reflects what has already been
happening, without any emissions reduction measures, for the last ten
18 See Executive Summary - The Clear Skies Initiative, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2002/02/clearskies.html (Feb. 14, 2002).

19 President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives, at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/environment/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
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years.20 We have had a reduction in greenhouse gas intensity for ten years at
about the same level simply by switching to a more service-oriented
economy and taking some voluntary measures that have usually involved
relatively low-hanging fruit. There is no reason to believe that, in the years
ahead, American industry has to do anything different to achieve the
President's policy goal.
The second flaw is that it relies entirely on voluntary actions. We have
had ten years of very thoughtful, very good, and sometimes quite sizable
voluntary actions by the United States, by industry, and by local
governments, to reduce gas emissions. Even the federal government has
joined the effort. We have learned a quite a bit from these experiments. One
thing we learned, however, is that relying on voluntary action alone is wholly
inadequate to solve the problem at the scale that it needs to be solved.
The third flaw is that the program lacks serious and concrete measures to
provide the incentives that would change the trajectory of the U.S. emissions.
There are no real measures to spark innovation, to harness the power of the
market, or to unlock the technological potential of U.S. industry to address
climate change. Canada should avoid following this particular model.
Trade Consequences of Kyoto
When Canada does take steps to implement whatever it needs to in order
to meet its Kyoto targets, several possible trade questions arise. Let me just
mention a couple.
A day may arise when, in order to achieve its targets, Canada adopts
certain "policies and measures, 21 a term used in Article H of the Protocol.
Such measures might include energy efficiency standards for vehicles or for
appliances, or industrial manufacturing standards. The question is whether
doing so will trigger any problems under Canada's WTO obligations. I
would say that, clearly, Canada is free to adopt such measures under Article
III of the GATT,22 so long as the standards are applied to the product, and are
identical for both domestic and foreign products.23
If, however, a standard were to be applied not just to the product but to
the process by which that product is manufactured, then we get into a more
24
difficult area. The environmental exceptions of Article XX(b) and (g)
20

See, e.g., Kelly Sims Gallagher, Bush's Hot Air Plan, at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/

0202greenhouse.pdf (Feb. 2002).
21 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 2(l)(a).
22 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. A-11, A14, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 206.
23 See id., art. XX
24 See id., art. XX(1):
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ought to allow the standard, provided that the non-discrimination
requirement in the chapeau of Article XX is met. In the WTO Shrimp-Turtle
Case, 25 the Appellate Body determined that a regulation that sought to protect
an endangered species by fixing standards on how seafood imported into the
United States was to be gathered was per se valid under Article XX. 26 The
U.S., which had adopted the environmental regulation, lost the case, but only
because of a finding that the regulation did not meet the nondiscriminatory
test.27 Even though, in principle, WTO decisions have no precedential value
for subsequent WTO cases, the Shrimp-Turtle case's determination - that
nations may legitimately consider the process and procedures of
manufacturing a product when importing goods - should support Canada's
right to adopt standards on manufacturing processes.
Yet another policy and measure that Canada might adopt involves product
labeling. In countries, such as both of ours, that have a strong bias toward
market-based solutions, labeling a product to demonstrate the degree of its
energy efficiency provides perhaps the most attractive method to steer
consumers toward choosing environmentally-friendly, energy-conserving
products. However, the risk is that the label could be accused of being - and
could in fact be - a disguised form of protection. A mandatory label that is
very directly related to the product's inherent character ("this apparatus
consumes X amount of fuel") would probably not be a problem. What if,
however, the label addressed the production characteristics of an item ("the
production of this item resulted in the emission of X amount of greenhouse
gases")? The law is not clear. My guess is that Canada should be able to
Whether,
impose such a requirement on Canadian-produced goods.
however, this requirement could also be imposed on U.S.-produced goods or
components is unclear.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: ...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption...
*25 WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp &
Shrimp Products [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle case], WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/R/Corr.I (May
15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998).
26 See id. at 299,
7.60, 7.61; WTO Appellate Panel Report on United States - Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R, $ 186
(Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 121, 174-175 (1999).
27 See id.; Shrimp-Turtle Panel, supra note 25, J 7.49, 37 I.L.M. at 295.
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A measure that quite likely could pose a contentious issue involves
climate-change-related taxation. Canada might seek to achieve its emissions
goals by some form of taxation either on energy or on carbon emissions.
Clearly, a significant energy or carbon emissions tax could hurt Canadian
manufacturers exporting to countries without such a tax. The generallyacceptable WTO response is via a "border tax adjustment,, 28 wherein
Canada, in order to make a product competitive in another market, would
"take off' its domestic tax once the product crossed the border. Would such
adjustments be acceptable in this case? I do not know, but such a tax is more
likely to be permissible when it seeks to compensate for taxes imposed on
such things as fuel, rather than taxes on products that have become more
expensive to produce because of the taxes on fuel.
The fact that Kyoto will be (correctly) viewed as an agreement of major
environmental significance, that it has such broad participation by the nations
of the world, and that it has its own fully-articulated compliance regime,
should bear significantly on the manner that issues that arise will be dealt
with by WTO Appellate bodies. I suspect that environmental measures taken
by Canada to comply with its obligations under Kyoto, while not relieving it
of its WTO obligations, will have a standing that they would not have if they
were simply adopted under domestic programs.
NAFTA CHAPTER 11: INVESTOR ENRICHMENT AT THE EXPENSE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?
Chapter 11, designed to protect investors from one NAFTA country that
invested in another NAFTA country, has been in effect for some eight years
now. It has, unexpectedly, spawned a number of cases challenging
environmental laws and regulations in all three NAFTA countries. These
cases raise starkly the question whether NAFTA's efforts to protect investors
has unacceptably compromised our nations' right to legislate in a way so as
to protect the environment and the health of their citizens. The cases sent
shock waves through the environmental community.
Regulating the
environment requires a delicate balancing of important public interests, and
many believe that the balance has been tilted by these cases in such a way so
that many environmental laws and regulations are threatened. In the United
States, there was a time in the early 1900s (often called the "Lochner Era,"
after the Supreme Court decision of Lochner v. New York29) during which a
28

See J.ANDREW

TAXATION:

THEORY

HOERNER, THE ROLE OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL

AND

U.S.

EXPERIENCE

6

(2000),

available at

http:/lwww.

sustainableeconomy.org/bta.pdf.
29 In Lochner v. New York, 25 S.Ct. 539, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court
overturned a conviction of a baker whose employees were permitted, contrary to state labor
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number of public measures, such as wage and hour laws and workplace
safety laws, were ruled unconstitutional "takings" under the U.S.
Constitution. The question is whether we are in that kind of era in CanadaU.S. relations, or whether the fear is overstated.
I want to distinguish this discussion from the more fundamentalist
argument put forth by a few American environmental organizations who
preach the gospel that much of our investment in foreign countries must be
viewed with concern because there is a linear progression from increased
investment to increased wealth to increased consumption to increased
That argument seems to be both bad
environmental degradation. 30
economics and a political dead end.
Rather, here, I am talking about whether these NAFTA-protected
investments curtail the ability of nations to protect their citizenry. That
protection requires governments to fix the context in which the investment
takes place and to set the standards that serve to balance the dual public
policy interests.
The NAFTA cases are both substantively and procedurally
groundbreaking. Substantively, the investor's charge is not that there is a
violation of some constitutional provision about taking without
compensation, but rather that there are treaty provisions designed to protect
investments which give the investor a specific new basis to challenge
environmental laws, a basis the investor would not otherwise have. These
cases are procedurally new because the process provides for arbitration
between a private foreign investor and the government of the jurisdiction
wherein the investment took place. Historically, trade disputes - charges of
discriminatory treatment or improper expropriation - have been tested in
state-versus-state cases.
NAFTA Tribunal Decisions Implicating Chapter 11
The first of the NAFTA cases was Ethyl Corporationv. Canada.31 Even
though it was never decided, the case set off shock waves. Ethyl challenged
a Canadian law banning the import and inter-provincial trade of MMT,32 an
additive to gasoline. 33 Ethyl Corporation, a U.S. company, was the only
manufacturer of MMT in the world. It had established a Canadian
subsidiary, Ethyl Canada, to receive MMT from the parent and mix and
law, to work more than 60 hours per week.
See, e.g., Megan Uzzell, Should Trade and the Environment Be Linked? at http://www.
drake.edu/artsci/PolSci/ssjrnl/uzzell.html (last visited June 8, 2002).
31 Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFA Arb. Trib. 1998).
32 That is, methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl. See id. at 709.
33 See id. at 710.
30
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distribute it across Canada. Canada had banned the import for a number of
reasons, none of which were ever quite clearly stated. Two reasons seem to
have been (1) a concern that the manganese in MMT had toxic properties not
fully assessed by science, and (2) a worry that the MMT would cause newlymandated pollution control equipment on automobile exhaust systems to
malfunction. The law did not, however, directly ban the sale or use of MMT
in Canada.34
Ethyl claimed that Chapter 11 had been violated in three ways: First, the
requirement of national treatment - that is, the requirement to treat foreign
investors no less favorably than domestic ones, as per Article 1102 - had
35
been violated because there was no ban on internal production and sale.
This claim was made even though there was no domestic Canadian producer
of MMT. Second, it was claimed that the import restriction, which, in effect,
required Ethyl to produce MMT in Canada, was equivalent to a
"performance requirement" banned by Article 1106.36 Third, and most
serious, Ethyl claimed that the Canadian ban was tantamount to expropriation
- a measure for which Ethyl should be fully compensated.37
The Arbitral Tribunal never ruled on these three claims. After it rejected
some Canadian jurisdictional arguments,38 Canada settled the case, paying
Ethyl $13 million for costs and lost profits while the Act was in place, and
withdrew the legislation.39 Canada explained that it settled mainly because
of an unfavorable domestic decision under Canada's Agreement on Internal
Trade (AIT),4 ° which stemmed from a complaint brought by the governments
of Alberta and some other provinces that claimed that the ban was a
restriction on interprovincial trade that violated the AIT.4'

34 Ethyl, 38 I.L.M. at 711.
35 Id.
36 Id.

31 See id.
38 See id. at 722-730.
39 See Another Broken NAFTA Promise: Challenge by U.S. CorporationLeads Canada to

Repeal Public Health Law, at http://www.bdidut.com/trade/more/Ethyl.htm (last visited June
8, 2002).
40 Agreement on Internal Trade, July 18, 1995 (Can.), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
sc mrkti/iptrade/engdoc/console4.pdf.
41 The AIT Arbitration panel found that
[i]t is clear... that it was the automobile manufacturers who were the driving force
behind the elimination of MMT. They claimed that the on-board monitoring
equipment in new vehicles would be impaired by the use of MMT-enhanced gasoline.
The evidence as to the impact of MMT on the environment is, at best, inconclusive.
Letter from U.S. Council of International Business to Gloria Blue, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the U.S. CIB and available online at http://www.
uscib.org/index.asp?documentlD=1829).
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One might think that a case never decided is a case destined for obscurity.
This was not the fate of Ethyl. The litigation raised a storm within the
environmental community. The community had been largely responsible for
the strong opposition to, and the eventual death of, the Multilateral
Agreement on Investments (MAI), then being negotiated at the OECD.42 It
had feared challenges, such as Ethyl's NAFTA challenge. The MAI was
' 3
described by one opponent as "NAFFA on steroids.A
Ethyl was followed by several other cases. In Metalclad v. Mexico,44 an
American corporation sued Mexico for failure to provide a transparent and
predictable framework for business planning, which resulted in Metalclad's
failing to receive a necessary license.45 In S.D. Myers v. Canada,46 an
American corporation sued Canada over its ban on the export of PCBs.4 7 In
Methanex v. U.S., 48 a Canadian manufacturer of methanol, a constituent of
the gasoline additive MBTE, claimed that California's ban on MBTE went
far beyond what was necessary to protect the public. 49 In yet another case,
Pope and Talbot v. Canada,50 an American company with operations in
Canada claimed that the loss of its traditional softwood lumber market due to
a Canadian export quota was an expropriation. 5'
A Few Serious Concerns
Let me briefly comment on five concerns raised by these cases.
Determining What Constitutes an "Expropriation": A New Standard?
This is at the heart of the debate, and I would say there is legitimate cause
for concern. These cases are the first under any investment treaty to rule that
42

See R.C. Longworth, Activists on Internet Reshaping Rules for Global Economy, CHI.

TRIB., July 5, 1999, at 1, availableat 1999 WL 2889904.
43 The phrase may have been coined by Lori Wallach, President of Public Citizen's Global
Trade Watch. See MAI: NAFTA on Steroids, at http://www.igc.org/lpa/lpv25/lp02.htm.
44 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
41 See id., (H40-41, 40 I.L.M at 43.
46 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
47 See id., 123, 40 I.L.M. at 1419.
48 Methanex Corp. v. U.S. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000), available at http://www.naftaclaims.
com.
49 See Complaint of Methanex Corporation in the Matter of a Claim Under Chapter 11,
Section A of the NAFTA 11
33(vi) (Dec. 3, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/8772.pdf.
"o Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.
naftaclaims.com.
51 See Statement of Claim by Pope & Talbot Inc. Under the Arbitration Rules of the U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law and the NAFTA U 89-95 (Mar. 25, 1999), available
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/pubdoc3.pdf.
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an environmental regulation may be tantamount to expropriation, even if the
regulation is non-discriminatory in its application and was undertaken for a
valid public purpose.
Several of the cases involve unclear or mixed motivation for the
legislation being challenged. That was true in Ethyl, S.D. Myers, and in
some others. But several of the tribunals seem not to care about the
lawmakers' intent. In Metalclad, the Tribunal expressly noted that it need
not "decide or consider the motivation or intent ' 52 of the environmental
measure at issue. Rather, it said the test should be whether there was a
significant impact "on the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit" of the property.53 In Pope and Talbot, the Tribunal again said that
the test for expropriation is one of the degree of interference with the
investment. Althoufh the Tribunal found that the interference was not
substantial enough, it did not apply a balancing test of any kind.
Furthermore, nothing was said about the public policy grounds for the
measure.
Clearly, the public welfare stakes are enormous. If this standard is
upheld, governments are going to have to pay for damages to investors
caused by their regulations even if the intent of the law is clearly
environmental protection. I cannot believe this will not result in some
"regulatory chill" - a timidity of regulation for fear of subjecting the state to
big liabilities. One Canadian official has suggested that he had not observed
such a "regulatory chill" effect to date; I actually find that hard to
understand. After all, the first two environmental laws adopted at the federal
level in Canada after NAFTA were both challenged under Chapter 11. One
was repealed and a big damage award paid (as per Ethyl); the other was held
to be a breach of Chapter 11, and a damage award is pending.55
In July of last year, the trade ministers of the three NAFTA countries (the
North American Free Trade Commission), taking into account the many
complaints about the process from both governments and NGOs, issued an
interpretation - the July Interpretation 56 - of certain provisions of Chapter 11.
The expropriation issue was not addressed. This was a major mistake. It is
highly desirable for the ministers to state clearly that non-discriminatory laws
that address the environment, public health, or similar public interests should
52 Metalclad, 40 I.L.M. at 51.

"

Id. at 50.
54 See Pope & Talbot v. Canada Interim Merits Award 11 74-76 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
2000), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/P&T-INTERIM AWARD.PDF.
55 That is, in the S.D. Myers arbitration.
56 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpre.asp [hereinafter July Interpretation].
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enjoy the traditional police power status in cases raising the expropriation
question.
Broadening the Scope of Investor Protection: The Definition of
"Investments" and the Concept of "Minimum International Standards"
The expropriation problem is compounded by the tribunals'
interpretations of certain terms in Chapter 11. In S.D. Myers, the Tribunal
included as an "investment" assets such as the market share a company had
achieved even though it owned no physical plant in the country.57 That
makes it difficult for a government even to identify potential challengers to
its environmental laws.
Chapter 11, like most bilateral investment agreements, requires a host
country to treat foreign investors in a way that meets minimum international
standards.
Specifically, it requires "treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security. '58 The Metalclad Tribunal read this requirement very broadly
indeed, and found that Mexico violated it because, among other things,
Metalclad was not notified of an important town meeting, 59 and Mexico
failed to establish clear ways for investors to know the rules. A breach of
Mexican law by any government agency at any level amounted to a breach of
this requirement.
The July Interpretation, in its most important part, went a long way to fix
this problem by stating that this obligation is no more onerous than that
which is granted under customary international law, and that a breach of
some other NAFTA provision or the provisions of some other international
agreement does not necessarily constitute a breach of Article 1105.60
The Baptist-Bootlegger Problem
If, contrary to the Metalclad and Pope and Talbot cases, the motivation
for enacting the legislation is a key to its validity, what of the case where the
motivation appears mixed? An instance is Ethyl, where Canada's legislative
motivation admittedly is quite unclear. There is evidence to support the
proposition that Environment Canada was genuinely concerned about air
quality, but there is also the claim of three Canadian provinces, echoed by

57 See S.D. Myers, 40 I.L.M. at 1431-34.
58

NAFTA Chapter 11, supra note 3, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639.

59 See Metalclad, 54, 40 I.L.M. at 44.
60 See July Interpretation, supra note 56, § B(3).
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of Ottawa favoring the OntarioEthyl, that the ban "is a blatant example
61
based car makers over the refineries."
Virtually every piece of environmental or conservation legislation or
regulation affects a commercial sector, and will thus be politically supported
(or opposed) by private interest groups. Often it will not be easy to tell what
motivated the governments. This is the "Baptist/Bootlegger" problem, an
obvious reference to the support given U.S. prohibition legislation by two
factions with wildly differing aims: the moral aims of the Baptists and the
commercial aims of the bootleggers. Just how much should this possible
duality matter? I would think that public policy would be best served by a
clear statement that is not, unfortunately, to be found anywhere in the
Chapter 11 cases. The mere fact that environmental legislation aids some
private interests and that the legislature took those interests into account
should not, by itself, invalidate the legislative measure, provided that it has
some basis in environmental protection. This is yet another instance where
the July Interpretation could have been expanded.
Environmental Standards and the "Sound Science" Rule
In the WTO, the crucial test to determine whether an environmental trade
sanction is permissible has been to ask whether the piece of legislation was
based on sound science.62 The dispute between the U.S. and the E.U.
involving beef hormones is a case in point.63 The problem of factoring sound
science into decision-making in trade issues almost scuttled the negotiations
on the Biosafety Protocol, 64 the agreement concerning international trade in
genetically modified agricultural products.
Some governments have challenged the concept that any standard for
valid regulation must be based on a "sound science," saying that it is much
61

Shawn McCarthy, Provinces Attack MMT Ban: Alberta Leads Charge in First Case

UnderInternal Trade Pact,GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 16, 1998, at B 1.
62

See, e.g., Beef & Beef Hormones Case (U.S. v. E.U.)

IV(25) (WTO Panel, 1997),

availableat http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/horml.wp5:
Measures must be based on scientific principles, as opposed to non-scientific ones,
such as superstition. If a measure was aimed at reducing or eliminating a risk to
health, then it must actually address that risk in a manner which [sic] could be
scientifically justified. If, for example, the measure was aimed at eliminating a
pathogenic organism from a food, there were several methods, e.g. heating, salting,
pickling, etc. which could be scientifically proven to be effective. If, however, a
Member required prayers to be said over the food, or a ritual dance to be performed
around it, that would not be compatible with the SPS Agreement because such
methods could not be scientifically proven to be effective [emphasis added].
63 See id.
64 Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 39 I.L.M.
1027 (2000).
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too tough a test, especially if it means that a rigorous cause-and-effect nexus
between the empirical scientific evidence and the national regulatory
measure chosen must be shown. 65 They point to examples where
government has acted at a time when the evidence of harm was not
conclusive. At a time when the evidence of lead's harmful health effects was
still controverted, the U.S. banned the sale of leaded gasoline.
The alternative to the "sound science:" test that has been suggested is the
"precautionary approach," which holds that if there is a small but serious
risk, regulators may and should err on the side of caution, even in the
absence of totally convincing evidence.
However, there is a legitimate concern that these Chapter 11 cases are
guided neither by the "sound science" nor the "precautionary approach"
standard. But it is probably premature to draw that conclusion. The cases to
date present a somewhat confused picture, and their effect on environmental
lawmaking and regulations remains unclear. In the Ethyl case, the Canadian
government's case was complicated by the fact that Canada did not ban
MMT as toxic under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.66 In any
event, in Ethyl, the health claims behind the ban on MMT were not based on
its direct toxic effect, but rather on the fact that it would cause auto exhaust
systems to malfunction, which would lead to increased pollution.
Concerns about Tribunal Secrecy and Restricted Participation
When I was in government and we contemplated trade issues and
disputes, we filtered our decision of whether to take a case to the WTO
tribunal, a NAFTA tribunal, or some other place through a wide spectrum of
public interest concerns: political relations with the other nations, domestic
public reaction, the precedent for future cases, or if our taking a case to the
tribunal would affect pending domestic legislation. I am not suggesting we
always came out on the correct side; we probably brought some cases we
should not have brought and did not bring some cases that we should have.
Nevertheless, that decision was made in a public policy context.
In sharp contrast, under Chapter 11, the investor has no such quandaries
to consider when he files his complaint. The investor has but one objective,
and that is a commercial one - one that will enable him to make money.

65 There is certainly a lack of agreement on what exactly "sound science" should mean;
what may amount to necessary phytosanitary standards in one country may indeed
discriminate against others. See, e.g., John S. Wilson, Advancing the WTO Agenda on Trade
and Standards: A Developing Country Voice in the Debate, available at http://www.

aercafrica.org/documents/standardsgeneva.doc.
66 Ethyl, 38 I.L.M. at 711.
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The problem of bringing to light public interest concerns is made more
difficult to date by the tribunals' maintenance of strong rules on secrecy surely to a much greater degree than is required. Filings and other
documents are not made public. While the July Interpretation pledged that
the parties to a Chapter 11 dispute will "make available to the public in a
timely manner all documents submitted to" a Chapter 11 tribunal.67
However, they also added an exception to this pledge for "information which
68
the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules, as applied.
Given the history of decisions by the tribunals, there is no way to tell whether
the pledge will have any practical effect.
Another procedural area that needs attention and change is whether third
parties have the right to participate fully in the process. A positive beginning
note was struck in Methanex, where the Tribunal indicated its intent to permit
the filing of amici curiae briefs by two NGOs.6 9 On the other hand, the
organizations were not permitted to present oral arguments.7 °
CONCLUSION
A "fix" of the problems in Chapter 11 is clearly needed. For a start, we
should look to the trade ministers who govern the NAFTA Commission and
are authorized to interpret NAFTA. According to NAFTA itself, those
interpretations carry significant weight. 71 The ministers took a meaningful
though timid step with the July Interpretation last year. Yet, they did not
touch the issue of expropriation at all. Both of our countries need to look at
this issue very carefully and, in concert with Mexico, should press the
Commission to insure, in some fashion, that NAFTA, in its efforts to protect
investors, does not jeopardize the ability of governments to protect their
citizens' health and to protect the environment. The balance between those
two interests at the moment is in jeopardy, and it is up to our two
governments to fix it. Thank you.

July Interpretation, supra note 56, § A(2)(b).
Id., § A(2)(b)(iii).
69 See Methanex v. U.S., On Petitions of Third Parties to Intervene as "Amici Curiae" 52
(NAFrA Arb. Trib. 2000), available at http://www.naftalaw.org/methanex/Methanex Amicus Decision.pdf.
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., NAFTA ch. XX(2).
67
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